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The epistemology of lethality: bullets, knowledge trajectories, kinetic effects 
 
The concept of lethality is contested. Bullets may shatter bone, trajectories may well follow 
predictable paths but the science of killing remains open to debate.1 When viewed at a macro 
level, statistical techniques can be applied to draw correlations between factors that lead to 
death through war. Colonel Trevor Dupuy drew statistical correlations in order to derive 
measures of combat effectiveness. Designed to offer a degree of certainty for military 
planners, the goal was to help generals predict how to achieve victory in battle.2 As this paper 
will show, however, when considered in micro detail the specific causal mechanisms by which 
lethality is produced become imprecise to the point that scientific analyses cannot resolve the 
anomalies. This is more than a macro/micro level of analysis problem. It reflects the 
epistemological challenge of defining the crossover point between life and death. Given the 
centrality of violence to martial doctrine, there are a number of reasons why militaries ignore 
the complexity of lethality and instead emphasise the binary – fight or flight – nature of killing. 
As this paper will show, much of this is related to processes of legitimating military practice 
while at the same time sustaining confidence in the strategist’s ambition of turning weapon 
effects into political outcomes. 
 
By reframing the science of killing as a process of legitimating martial practice, this paper 
analyses the structures of knowledge that sustain the notion of lethality as it is applied in – 
particularly contemporary American and British – military doctrine. Examining the evolution 
of the concept, especially as it relates to the production of death by bullet, the multiple and 
contested meanings of lethality are made transparent. From this it becomes clear how some 
readings of lethality are suppressed or rendered taboo by the armed forces and their industrial 
partners who seek to preserve the fiction that science both offers certainty in war and 
underpins the utility of military operations. The minutiae of terminal ballistics and in particular 
the application of scientific method for defining lethality can thus be used to analyse the 
politics and sociology of knowledge as the discourse evolves from the battlefield into the 
                                                        
1 Rob Kling, “When Gunfire Shatters Bone: Reducing Sociotechnical Systems to Social Relationships,” Science, 
Technology, and Human Values 17, no. 3 (1992).  
2 Trevor Dupuy, Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Fairfax, Virginia: Da Capo Press, 1984). 
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bureaucracy and beyond. This in turn uncovers the social and scientific practices that are used 
to render normative conceptions of lethality in technical and apolitical terms. 
 
What emerges from this analysis is how the discourse of lethality as both science and as 
doctrine conjoins in the language of kinetic effects. Kinetic effects is now a dominant phrase 
in Anglo-American policy and procurement circles, connoting the use of force to strike an 
enemy so as to achieve a certain battlefield outcome.3 For the military, a kinetic operation can 
produce a killing effect and at the same time influence human behaviour. Alternatively, a 
kinetic operation can be used as a display of force so as to influence behaviour but without 
producing death. 4  This way of conceptualising military technique continues to shape US 
strategy under President Trump but it had particular utility for those engaged in 
counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 However, as this paper will show, the doctrinal 
edifice that has been built on the language of lethality, where coercion is balanced against 
winning hearts and minds, rests on a reification of the science of killing that cannot stand up 
when exposed to close scrutiny. 
 
A detailed investigation into the epistemology of lethality thus presents an opportunity to 
reveal the intellectual fissures and scientific uncertainties that have been reified and 
embedded into contemporary conceptions of military power. This not only tells us something 
about the processes by which science is subordinated to war but also offers a new lens from 
which to consider how knowledge claims are co-constructed and legitimated through military 
practices. As a result, this paper recovers a narrative that is otherwise hidden by ontologies of 
                                                        
3 See for instance, ‘Future Kinetic Effects and Weapons Systems Programme’ published by the Defence Science 
and Technology Laboratory, 1 January 2018. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/future-kinetic-effects-
and-weapons-systems-programme. Site accessed 15 November 2018. 
4 See the many references to kinetic, non-kinetic and influencing effects in the British Army’s counterinsurgency 
manual, British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency Army Code 71876 October 2009. 
5 Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, House Armed Services Committee, written statement for the record. 
Monday, June 12, 2017. Available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0ahUKEwiJnp3u15zaAhUrxVQ
KHfZ3Bu8QFghSMAc&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdocs.house.gov%2Fmeetings%2FAS%2FAS00%2F20170612%2F106
090%2FHHRG-115-AS00-Bio-MattisJ-20170612.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2xLwRu_Ov7nI5qzUQYXGZX. Accessed 2 
April 2018. 
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war that emphasise fighting as its central feature, and in the process represents a further 
analysis of Brighton and Barkawi’s argument for a critical war studies.6  
 
In order to fully develop this argument, this paper makes four moves. In the first step, drawing 
on Brighton and Barkawi’s seminal paper on critical war studies and the ontology of war, I 
develop a framework for locating lethality within its scientific and military-technical 
knowledge regimes.7 This will create a lens for analysing how lethality is a contested concept. 
In the second step, I historicise the concept of lethality, explore its knowledge trajectories and 
show how its meaning stabilised. This will reveal how the notion is rooted in the interstices 
between the prejudices, professions and technical disciplines of soldiers, surgeons, scientists 
and engineers. In the third section, I relate lethality to contemporary military doctrine and 
draw out the contradictions that remain inherent in the discourses of kinetic effect. This is 
most clearly exposed in relation to counterinsurgency and the military’s ambition to apply 
force judiciously. Finally, in the last section, I analyse the way that lethality is used to legitimate 
military power and consider how this contributes to our understanding of the ontology of war. 
 
Locating lethality: knowledge regimes, assemblages and the ontologies of war 
In their paper, Powers of War, Brighton and Barkawi contend that fighting constitutes the 
ontology of war. Citing Clausewitz, they observe that the uncertainty of the physical struggle 
comprises the opportunity from which politics and society can be made over.8 As such, war 
implies antagonists, an enemy, or some ‘other’ that must be combatted. Viewed 
instrumentally fighting is a matter of producing certain effects on an enemy so as to engender 
political change. Brighton and Barkawi go further than this, however, asking epistemic 
questions about how fighting refashions subjects and discourses and transforms perspectives 
in ways that stretch well beyond the strategic calculus to form what they describe as 
war/truth. In these conditions the battlefield creates the opportunity for unmaking and 
remaking what might be considered an epistemological given. The uncertainty produced by 
combat thus occurs at two levels: not only in terms of war’s political-strategic logic but also in                                                         
6  T. Barkawi and S. Brighton, “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique,” International Political 
Sociology 5, no. 2 (2011). 
7 K. Grint and S. Woolgar, “Computers, Guns, and Roses - What's Social About Being Shot,” Science Technology 
& Human Values 17, no. 3 (1992). 
8 Barkawi & Brighton, (2011). 
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terms of what constitutes a knowledge claim about fighting and battle and the implications 
such knowledge claims have for war and society. 
 
Brighton and Barkawi highlight the generative nature of war in order to establish the central 
concerns of a critical war studies, a field that aims at tracking the disruptive epistemic effects 
of fighting as it remakes social and political order. As Nordin and Öberg observe, however, this 
formulation of ‘war-as-fighting’ also has the effect of reifying ontologies of war such that 
‘politics, ethics, security or gender risk being forced through the mould of this particular 
ontology…’ irrespective of ‘whether this is actually taking place or not’.9 Instead Nordin and 
Öberg ask ‘what does the idea that war is antagonistic and generative obscure?’10 Citing the 
example of target processing they draw attention to the relentless, 24 hour, 365 day a year 
process of putting ‘warheads on foreheads’.11 This process involves an ongoing cycle that 
removes the antagonisms of the physical struggle and instead replaces it with staff work and 
doctrine. The result, they argue, is one where the operationalising of warfare ‘is making war in 
the Clausewitzian sense disappear’ even as it re-instantiates itself in television, art, computer 
games, military recruitment and the arms industry. 12  While these locations might not be 
central to a philosophy that frames war-as-fighting, they nonetheless still constitute significant 
sites from which to track war’s ontological grounding. The cumulative effect of Brighton and 
Barkawi and Nordin and Öberg, is, then, to both retrieve fighting from technocratic 
descriptions of war and to find ways of extending the field of critical war studies into domains 
that stretch beyond the physical struggle. Curiously, however, despite the fact that science 
inspired the work of 17th and 18th century strategists like Bülow and Jomini – contemporary 
strategists with predispositions rivalling and more scientific than those of Clausewitz – neither 
Brighton and Barkawi nor Nordin and Öberg discuss how scientific analysis says something 
about the ontology of war.13 
 
                                                        
9 Astrid Nordin and Dan Öberg, “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard,” Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 43, no. 2 (2015), p. 409.   
10 Nordin and Öberg (2015), pp. 406-407. 
11 A. Bousquet, The Eye of War - military perception from the telescope to the drone (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 2018), p. 5. 
12 Nordin and Öberg (2015), p. 406. 
13 B. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002). 
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As it stands, then, while critical war studies has explored how the uncertainty of war relates 
to war’s ontology, the field has downplayed the significance of those strategists seeking to 
reduce the uncertainty of combat by scientifically quantifying battlefield variables. Instead, by 
restoring fighting as the central feature of war, Brighton and Barkawi follow the Clausewitzian 
formula that war ‘…belongs not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of 
social life’.14 Clausewitzian interpretations dominate contemporary debate on war. It does not 
follow, however, that scientific knowledge has no bearing for those working in the field of 
critical war studies. For if fighting constitutes war’s ontology then scientific analysis of the 
battlefield denotes a unique sociological site for tracing the structures of knowledge as it 
relates to combat. Indeed, when viewed conventionally, the methodological foundation of 
science offers the means by which an objective yardstick can be developed for defining the 
reality of battle. According to this line of reasoning, the scientific method itself represents a 
process by which a disorderly judgement about fighting becomes a socially accepted scientific 
fact for those administering war. 
 
That is not to say that the scientific method and its approach to the production of facts have 
escaped the critical eye. On the contrary, social theorists like Woolgar and Latour have 
developed an anthropology of the laboratory that deconstructed the scientific method along 
sociological lines. This revealed the socio-technical processes that are inherent in the 
production of scientific facts and showed how the imposition of various frameworks by 
scientists was designed to reduce background noise so that they could impose order out of 
confusion.15 As Woolgar and Latour demonstrate, the decisions about what background noise 
ought to be reduced are themselves framed by inter-subjective cultures that are engendered 
through the craftlike practice of the scientific activity itself.16 
 
When applied to critical war studies, Woolgar and Latour’s seminal analysis has important 
ramifications in a discussion of war’s ontology. In the first instance, Woolgar and Latour 
recognise how technology itself is constitutive of science, framing and shaping the scientific                                                         
14 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (London: Everyman, 1993), Book 
2 Chapter 3, ‘Usage still unsettled’ 
15 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts (London: Sage Publications, 
1979), pp. 36-37. 
16 Latour & Woolgar (1979), p.29. 
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imaginary. In the second, they create the necessary conditions for applying a variety of 
methodologies – whether Actor Network Theory or approaches based on assemblages – to an 
analysis of war, technology and the science of killing. 17  These methods bind the social 
structures of meaning to the martial technologies under investigation in the same way that 
technology is constitutive of science. 
 
By opening the lethality black box, then, we can start to see how the technologies of war are 
a constitutive part of the reification of war-as-killing. More than this, lethality not only 
constitutes a particular type of knowledge regime that has in some way become subsumed 
into notions of fighting but also produces end states with ontological consequences. 
Ontologically speaking, the question of life and death is binary. Humans are either ‘alive’ or 
they ‘are not alive’. Yet as will become evident, when it comes to questions of lethality, the 
methodological challenge of defining a crossover point between being and nothingness is 
scientifically and technically disobedient. Laboratory experiment has been unable to generate 
the level of certainty necessary to define the optimal process of killing in war. On the 
battlefield the technological expressions of this uncertainty typically manifest themselves in 
either ‘overkill’ or defeat; where overkill is scientifically determined as the over application of 
lethal force. Consequently, Brighton and Barkawi’s argument that ‘the chaotic and 
unpredictable unmaking of certainties’ through fighting also has parallels in the scientific 
realm of lethality.18 This stems from both the inability to reproduce battlefield conditions in 
the laboratory and the unique socio-technical challenges that frame the process of trying to 
model the point at which life becomes death. 
 
In this respect, as Grint and Woolgar argue, functional interpretations of technology do not 
help generate more certainty in how lethality is defined.19 To suggest otherwise produces two 
theoretically loaded observations. Firstly, a functional interpretation implies that weapons 
produce definable outcomes. Secondly, and flowing from this, a functional interpretation 
implies that a weapon has some inherent design capacity that is essential to the technology                                                         
17 B. Latour, “On actor-network theory: a few clarifications” Soziale Welt, 47 no, 4 (1996), pp. 369-381; G. 
Deleuze, and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
18 Barkawi & Brighton, (2011), p. 139. 
19 K. Grint and S. Woolgar, The Machine at Work: Technology, Work, and Organization  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1997). 
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itself. In terms of theory, both of these propositions are problematic as they denote 
technological determinism and treat technology as an independent variable rather than a 
constitutive feature of a socio-technical framework. 
 
At an empirical level, however, the challenge of trying to define lethality emerges at the very 
moment that scientists seek to analyse the phenomenon. While evaluating wound and 
terminal ballistics provides the hope that ready measurements of battlefield practices might 
be made, producing scientifically valid conceptions of lethality is made complex in that every 
single use of a weapon on the battlefield is necessarily unique to the circumstances of its 
discharge.20 Given the range of unknown variables that cannot be accounted for, logically its 
results cannot be reproduced in an open system. A causal explanation of lethality thus 
requires the creation of a closed environment under laboratory conditions, shooting bullets 
into blocks of wax or simulant gels. In these instances, the variables can be isolated and 
mathematical conclusions drawn. Such an approach nevertheless assumes an essentialist 
reading of a weapon, one where its meanings are defined by its function. 
 
In these circumstances, when thinking about weapons and their effects, an anti-essentialist 
heuristic shows how lethality gains meaning within a socio-technical framework of 
relationships. Like Woolgar and Latour’s work on the laboratory this makes it possible to 
analyse the way that a particular interpretation of lethality is reinforced as a social fact for 
those engaged in ordnance design, development and use. This analysis, in turn, helps us to 
understand the criteria for developing a scientific explanation of killing in war and provides us 
with the means for showing how science is institutionalised and legitimated through the 
military and out into its associated industrial supply chains. As will become clear throughout 
the rest of this paper, this further demonstrates how countervailing structures of evidence 
and value judgement overlap and frame the epistemology of lethality. 
 
A short history of lethality 
Historicising notions of lethality reveals the many cleavages and contrasting frames for making 
sense of an increasingly industrial and scientific approach to producing death. The concept of                                                         
20 B. P. Kneubuehl, R. M Coupland, M. A. Rothschild, and M. J. Thali, Wound Ballistics - Basics and Applications 
(Berlin: Springer, 2008), p. 165. 
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lethality emerges from and is bounded by the state’s technical capacity to engage engineers, 
scientists, soldiers and surgeons. These constituencies bring with them their associated 
habitus and modes of classification. As notions of lethality move from subjective reasoning to 
social fact, an analysis of how War/Truth – at least as it might be made sense of through 
techniques of killing – stabilises and becomes open to further investigation. More than this, 
by historicising lethality, the very bedrock upon which the martial traditions develop their 
legitimacy gets thrown into a new light, a process which in itself demands further explanation. 
 
Far from originating in military discourse, the concept of lethality has its roots in the 
bureaucratised efforts of local officials, engineers and doctors who sought to protect 
community health and sanitation in the 19th century. As a field of investigation, it brought 
together a variety of different professions and experts looking to use large-scale data 
collection methods to interpret and manage morbidity in population groups, what Foucault 
identified as biopolitics.21 Working at different ends of the problem, these professions sought 
to improve the effectiveness of public engineering or make interventions to treat disease. 
While such efforts might have universal application, a measurement of their success in 
reducing morbidity could not, however, be assumed. This became much more readily 
apparent in the 1890s when officials of what would become the World Health Organisation 
started on the production of an International Classification of Disease. As Geoffrey Bowker 
and Susan Leigh Star demonstrate, different medical establishments in different parts of the 
world recorded death in different ways. As a consequence, classification of morbidity could 
not be readily universalised, because social mores particular to a political community – 
matters, for example, related to race, gender, marital status, class or colonial status – would 
typically frame and/or override medical judgement.22 
 
The notion that lethality might be a way to think about optimising killing rather than 
preventing death had not been seriously considered within the military and its associated 
industrial supply chains even as the First World War took its toll on empires at war. Optimising 
lethality was not the driving concern of engineers working on armament design. Instead,                                                         
21 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-76  (New York: Picador, 2002). 
22 G. Bowker and S. Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences  (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999). 
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engineering imperatives relating to standardisation, mass production and the 
commodification of weapon’s technology underpinned the ambition of engineers who sought 
to further refine tolerances in armament design.23 Of course artillery and ordnance designers 
had worked on this for centuries.24 But by the mid-19th century standardised approaches to 
industrial manufacturing and innovations in ordnance design opened up questions that 
demanded methodological changes to how lethality was defined. This prompted a number of 
investigations into the penetrative effects of ammunition from which a rule of thumb 
definition of lethality emerged. This gauged lethality by how deep a bullet might travel into 
wood.25 By the 1880s, this had further iterated into expressions of lethality framed by whether 
bullets could kill a cavalry horse.26 
 
At the turn of the 20th century the meaning of lethality changed once again, this time along 
racially motivated lines such that modes of killing among European powers was deemed to be 
methodologically different to those used against colonial insurgents.27 Prompting the Indian 
Army to develop the dumdum bullet, this became most obvious during the colonial campaigns 
on the North West Frontier. The dumdum subsequently became a bone of contention during 
the Boer War where Britain was chastised by its European rivals for using ammunition 
designed for ‘savage’ warfare against colonists of European descent. For the critics, if the 
dumdum could be used against white Dutch descendants then what would stop military 
practices from uncivilised colonial wars creeping into warfare between European powers? If 
                                                        
23 C. Trebilcock, "A Special Relationship - Government, Rearmament, and the Cordite Firms," Economic History 
Review 19(1966); ""Spin-Off" in British Economic History: Armaments and Industry 1760-1914," Economic 
History Review 22  no. 2 (1969); "Legends of the British Armaments Industry 1890-1914: A Revision," Journal of 
Contemporary History 5  (1970); "British Armamanets and European Industrialisation, 1890-1914," Economic 
History Review 26  no. 2 (1973). See also Matthew Ford, Science and Technology (Great Britain and Ireland), in, 
1914-1918-online. International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver 
Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 
2018-04-18. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.11082. 
24 K. Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). 
25 B. P. Kneubuehl et al. (2008). p.92. 
26 M. Ford, “Towards a Revolution in Firepower? Logistics, Lethality, and the Lee-Metford,” War in History,  20, 
no. 3 (2013), pp. 273-299. 
27 K. Wagner, “Savage Warfare: violence and the colonial rule of difference in British counterinsurgency”, History 
Workshop Journal, 03 January 2018, pp. 1-22. 
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this possibility was to be prevented, then a more precise definition of lethality would be 
required, one that might find force in the 1899 Geneva Convention on humane weaponry.28 
 
Framed by increased medical engagement with bullet effects,29 the definition that the armed 
forces arrived at had to balance what soldiers believed to be militarily expedient with what 
European powers considered to be internationally acceptable. The concept of lethality thus 
morphed from the need to knock down cavalry horses towards a definition that emphasised 
‘stopping power’. This reflected the general distrust of soldiers who concluded that small 
calibre ammunition produced insufficient power to stop an enemy dead in their tracks. 
Formally codified by the American small arms designer, Captain Robert Thompson and the 
military surgeon Major Louis LaGarde the notion that ordnance lethality should be defined by 
stopping power proved to be enormously persuasive for soldiers. 30  For not only did the 
concept appear rooted in the experiments and calculations of a credible medical authority but 
it also resonated deeply with those soldiers who also sought mechanical certainty in the 
production of battlefield wounding. Even before practitioners and strategists like Clausewitz 
had observed that ‘war is the province of uncertainty’, the military had long understood that 
chaos and complexity was the norm in battle and had sought ways by which to limit its effects 
through drill and repetitive movement. 31 However, drills and movement were subject to 
human frailties. By contrast, Thompson and Lagarde offered the technological means by which 
they could further guarantee the result of battle. When it came to the tactical engagement, 
then, the best way to achieve a level of certainty that left no room for doubt about the 
outcome of firing a rifle was to adopt a weapon that would assure the soldier they could stop 
someone dead. 
 
Intimately connected to the desire of weapon designers to win contracts with the US Army, 
the Thompson/LaGarde definition of stopping power offered a veneer of scientific authority 
                                                        
28  S. Keefer, “‘Explosive Missals’: International Law, Technology, and Security in Nineteenth-Century 
Disarmament Conferences”, War in History 21, no. 4 (2014). 
29 J. Gould, “Observations on the Action of the Lee-Metford Bullet on Bone and Soft Tissues in the Human Body” 
The British Medical Journal, 2 (1895), pp. 129-130; H.G. Beyer, “Experiment and Experience with the Rifle.” 
Boston Medical and Surgical Journal” Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 144, no. 1 (1901), pp. 1–10. 
30 C. J. Chivers, The Gun  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). pp. 233-235. 
31 William McNeil, Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard 
University Press, 1995. 
Page 11 of 28 
that proved persuasive to those responsible for weapon acquisition. Nevertheless, with the 
US Army engaged in what became a controversial re-evaluation of its small arms requirements 
in the 1920s and 1930s, ordnance officials found themselves turning to the US Army’s medical 
establishment to arbitrate between ammunition designs and in the process sharpen up the 
science of killing.32 Although senior American commanders who had not been on the front 
line remained wedded to marksmanship, many officers in the US military concluded that the 
infantry would need greater firepower if they were to win tactical engagements. 33  The 
engineering challenge that emerged out of this clash of expectations within the US Army 
involved the establishment of at least two boards of investigation – colloquially known as the 
Pig and subsequently the Goat Board – and resulted in ordnance officials abandoning the 
stopping power criterion in favour of kinetic energy.34 Specifically, the Americans claimed that 
58 ft lbs (80 joules) of kinetic energy was required in order to guarantee death.35 
 
Despite the emergence of the kinetic energy criterion, a scientific method had never been 
formally applied to the problem of lethality prior to the Second World War. Engineers and 
medics were responsible for defining the technological challenge of producing lethal effect. 
The result was a mode of thinking rooted in surgery, engineering mechanics and framed by an 
appreciation for metallurgy. The goal was to develop an absolute criterion that would help 
ordnance designers and manufacturers by offering specific values from which to design and 
build equipment. Like life and death, the engineering assumption was that a technology either 
had the capacity to kill or it did not. In this context scientific investigations into the empirical 
effects of ordnance on the human body were unnecessary: medics and surgeons could offer 
an appropriate indicator of lethality without the need to undertake the systematic collection 
of data from First World War battlefields. Scientific explanations that sought to develop and 
test different hypotheses about lethality were unnecessary in the circumstances as it was 
                                                        
32 E. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War 2 through 
Vietnam and Beyond  (Harrisburg, Pa.: Harrisburg 1984). 
33 R. Gilmore, "'The New Courage': Rifles and Soldier Individualism, 1876-1918," Military Affairs 40, no. 3 (1976). 
34  T. McNaugher, The M-16 Controversies – Military Organisations and Weapons Acquisition  (New York: 
Praeger, 1984). 
35 See, ‘A review of the criteria of wounding power in common use’ by Dr B. Deslisle Burns and Dr P.L. Krohn, 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, Oxford Research Unit, Scientific and Technical Memoranda No.C.3/45, 11 
October 1945, p.1, SZ/OEMU/47/19/31, Zuckerman Papers, University of East Anglia. 
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assumed effective explanations could be deduced from what limited data had already been 
collected. 
 
With the advent of the Second World War, however, scientists began to challenge the mind-
set that assumed lethality was in some way obvious. Central to this effort was the work of the 
anatomist Solly Zuckerman.36 Concluding that no data of any real scientific value had been 
collected during the First World War, Zuckerman initially headed off to the battlefields of 
Northern France in early 1940. Collecting cadavers, Zuckerman put himself in a position to test 
existing theories of lethality and in the process help to refashion the discipline along more 
scientific lines. Although the data he was able to collect was limited by the speed of the 
German advance across the low countries, Zuckerman had sketched out enough of a research 
programme that he could go back to the UK and justify further investigations. The opportunity 
for this came as a result of the Luftwaffe bombing campaign against London in the latter half 
of 1940. 
 
Eventually culminating in a research paper known as RC350, Zuckerman and his team 
established that the 58 ft lb kinetic energy criterion might have offered a rule of thumb for 
engineers but that it did not in fact offer a scientific basis for describing lethality.37 On the 
contrary, the British scientists established that the momentum lost by a missile travelling 
through the body was directly proportional to the degree of tissue destruction. The greater 
momentum, the greater the tissue destruction. Furthermore, statistical analysis showed that 
the 400mg weight of ordnance implied by the 58 ft lb criterion was way above the threshold 
needed to generate death. In fact, projectiles weighing as little as 52mg, or 1/20th of a gram, 
projectiles that were tiny compared to observations taken from the battlefield, were sufficient 
to produce hospitalisation.38 The kinetic energy criterion of 58 ft lbs was not sophisticated 
enough for Zuckerman et al.                                                         
36 S. Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords: an Autobiography, (London: Collins, 1988); S. Zuckerman, A.N. Black, 
and D. Delisle Burns, "An Experimental Study of the Wounding Mechanism of High Velocity Missiles." British 
Medical Journal no. ii (1941). 
37 B. Delisle Burns and S. Zuckerman, ‘The Wounding Power of Small Bomb and Shell Fragments’, RC350, October 
1942, HO 195/13/350, TNA. 
38 This calculation was made possible because two values in the equation for kinetic energy were known. Kinetic 
energy is defined as half mass multiplied by the square of velocity or KE = 1/2mv2. Rearranging the equation to 
determine the mass gives results in m = 2KE/v2. Based on the assumption that it took 58 ft lbs to incapacitate 
and a fragment from a bomb blast struck the target at 2000fps, the mass of a projectile had to be greater than 
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Instead, what Zuckerman could show was that there was a probabilistic relationship between 
the ordnance’s momentum and the likelihood of hospitalisation. However, if the 58 ft lb, ‘all 
or nothing’ criteria lacked precision then the probabilistic calculations that emerged out of the 
momentum criterion created controversy with American engineers, medics and scientists. On 
the one hand, a probabilistic calculation implied lethality wasn’t a binary affair. On the other, 
it seemed to offer an explanation as to why some soldiers would keep shooting even after 
they had been wounded by enemy action. Zuckerman’s research into the science of lethality 
thus implied a rational explanation for how battlefield context, psychology and adrenaline 
might have an impact on tactical engagements.  
 
The opportunity to scientifically demonstrate how psychology and adrenaline had an impact 
on combat effectiveness and hospitalisation arrived out of operational research undertaken 
by Zuckerman following the failed Allied raid on Dieppe in 1942. Previously the conventional 
understanding of the fight or flight reflexes had been shaped by war in the colonies. 
Axiomatically, as Charles Callwell demonstrates in his book Small Wars, European powers 
considered these wars to be of a different nature to war in Europe.39 In medical circles the 
result was an attitude that emphasised the differences between white and non-white soldiers. 
Thus Surgeon-Major J.B. Hamilton could write, ‘As a rule when a “white man” is wounded he 
has had enough, and it quite ready to drop out of the ranks and go to the rear; but the savage, 
like the tiger, is not so impressionable, and will go on fighting even when desperately 
wounded.’40 In his analysis of the Dieppe raid, however, Zuckerman effectively took race out 
of an explanation of fight or flight. 
 
Asked by Lord Mountbatten, the chief of Combined Operations Command, to establish what 
went wrong during the raid, Zuckerman established that many of the Canadian troops found 
themselves stuck and unable to clear obstacles or scale the seawall. With their backs to the 
sea and in the teeth of heavy German fire from deep entrenchments and pillboxes,                                                         
0.014oz (i.e. 1/70th of an oz or 400mg). See, Dr B. Delisle Burns and Dr P.L. Krohn, ‘A Review of the Criteria of 
Wounding in Common Use’, Ministry of Aircraft Production, Oxford Research Unit, Scientific and Technical 
Memoranda, 11 October 1945. SZ/OEMU/47/19/31, Zuckerman Papers, UEA, p.4. 
39 C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: their Principles and Practice (HMSO: London, 1896, 1899, 1906). 
40 J. B. Hamilton, ‘The Evolution of the Dum-Dum Bullet’, British Medical Journal 14 May 1898, pp. 1250-1250. 
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Zuckerman’s analysis revealed that soldiers fighting in such desperate conditions would carry 
on using their weapons irrespective of the wounds they had received. Zuckerman later 
surmised that they did this because they knew they were helping their comrades who were 
trying to escape.41 This wasn’t a matter of race, gender or training. Rather it was a question of 
circumstances and the probability that soldiers would be struck by ordnance with sufficient 
momentum as to produce hospitalisation. 
 
For those American engineers wedded to the absolute criterion of wounding, Zuckerman’s 
research findings appeared to undermine and refashion a whole field of ordnance engineering 
and design. This was particularly problematic to those in the American Medical Corps and 
Ordnance Corps who had instilled so much of their reputation and authority into defining 
lethality as a relationship to kinetic energy. Initiating a series of studies that sought to test the 
validity of Zuckerman’s findings, Colonel George Callender, the commandant of the Army 
Medical Center arranged for teams of pathologists to collect data from battlefields in Burma, 
Bougainville and Italy and from the Eighth US Air Force engaging in the strategic bombing of 
Europe.42 Callender had hoped he could do more but it was impossible to field a sufficient 
numbers of pathologists to cover all the fighting fronts and so he was forced to take a more 
limited approach to data collection in the hope that this analysis would place Zuckerman’s 
own research into statistical context.43 
 
Beyond data collection from the battlefield, Callender sought to undermine the momentum 
criterion by engaging a Princeton zoologist, Professor Edmund Newton Harvey, in primary 
laboratory analysis. In contrast to Zuckerman, what Newton Harvey and his colleagues 
observed was that a bullet travelling at high velocity created a permanent and a temporary 
cavity within a victim. Using ballistic gel as a datum, photographs showed that bullets created 
a temporary cavity that expanded and contracted several times along the missile’s trajectory 
                                                        
41 See ‘Survey of Casualties in Combined Operations against Dieppe carried out on the 19th August 1942’, report 
by Professor Solly Zuckerman to the Chief of Combined Operations. SZ/OEMU/48/5, Zuckerman Papers, UEA. 
42 J.C. Colonel Beyer Jr (ed.), Wound Ballistics, Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of 
the Army, 1962; Preface. Report available at: 
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/thoracicsurgeryvolII/default.htm. accessed 14 March 2018. 
43 In conversations with British Army Medical Corps personnel, I have been told that it would remain a practical 
impossibility to undertake the level of pathology required to evaluate the circumstances of death for all those 
involved in combat at the level of intensity experienced during the Second World War. 
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before collapsing completely. The bullet also created a permanent cavity which remained even 
after the missile had passed through the body. Even though at first sight tissue destruction 
seemed limited to the permanent track, in fact the trauma to the body was considerably more 
widespread. Unconvinced by Zuckerman’s claim that there was a relationship between a 
projectile’s loss of momentum inside the body, the depth of the projectile inside tissue and 
the need for hospitalisation, Newton Harvey reported that ‘Study and measurement of 
temporary [wound] cavities show that the total volume of the cavity is proportional to the 
energy delivered by the missile’.44 Subsequent research came to the conclusion that 58 ft lbs 
was indeed a fair approximation for the required energy needed to cause the kinds of 
cavitation that had been identified in the photographs. American scientists could thus 
reassure the US engineering and ordnance community that the energy criterion provided a 
rough estimate of the wounding power of small missiles.45 
 
Empirically speaking, then, the science of killing evolved such that primarily British and 
American scientists working at the time of the Second World War produced conflicting 
analyses of lethality. By the mid-1950s, scientific agreement had still not been reached. That 
is not to say that decisions about ordnance were put on hold. Indeed, as Erik Prokosch 
elaborates, the early Cold War witnessed some significant developments in the technologies 
of death.46 However, this was not achieved on the basis that the science was in any way 
settled. British and American engineers still needed to satisfy the requirements of their user 
communities. Whether these requirements were met in the most optimal manner as defined 
by a scientific analysis of the alternatives could only be determined in accordance with 
national perspectives. 
 
Author Criterion Year 
Benton Bullet passes through fir plank 1867 
Rhone Kinetic energy 58 ft lb or 80 joules 1896 
Zuckerman m0.4v (bullet passes through) 1942 
Sperrazza and Allen mv3/2 1956                                                         
44 Erik Prokosch, The Technology of Killing: a military and political history of anti-personnel weapons (London: 
Zed Books, 1995), p. 20. 
45 See, ‘Memorandum for Dr. J.F. Fulton on the Use of 58 ft lbs as a Criterion of  Incapacitation’, 16 March 1945, 
SZ/OEMU/44/17/79, Zuckerman Papers, UEA. 
46 Prokosch (1995). 
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Dziemian E1–15cms energy transfer in 15cm of gelatine 1960 
Sturdivan Expected Kinetic Energy 1975 
Table 1: Summary of Effectiveness Criteria47 
 
After the war, with the debate still unresolved one way or another, US definitions of lethality 
increasingly held sway over the approach taken to ordnance design. This was not a function 
of any one piece of analysis being more correct than another but rather reflected the pattern 
of investment into primary research on lethality. With the formation of NATO and the 
rebuilding of Europe, there was little need for European powers to press their research 
community into working on questions of lethality. Instead, states were preoccupied with the 
high politics of nuclear weapons and deterrence. Consequently, the debates between 1955 
and 1979 tended to be controlled by the US, the one power that continued to invest in primary 
research into lethality. The only concession that the United States was prepared to make to 
Solly Zuckerman and the British analysis from the Second World War was to recognise the 
importance of velocity for delivering increased kinetic effect. This in turn led to evolution of 
the Small Calibre, High Velocity bullet concept that underpinned the ammunition for the M16 
rifle.  
 
Unable to reach some form of agreement on processes of lethality, scientific communities in 
Britain and the US could continue to develop explanations according to their own principles. 
The mechanisms that might have helped facilitate the stabilisation of a theory of lethality 
could not be defined. Instead the result was a multiplicity of interpretations. This only changed 
as the British withdrew from undertaking primary scientific research into lethality, thus 
conceding the field to their American partners. This in turn conceded the definition of lethality 
to American researchers and a community of non-scientists who had an interest in sustaining 
the kinetic energy criterion and in effect legitimated existing ordnance design and production 
practices. Indeed, while other theories have come and gone (see Table 1), what has emerged 
out of the various investigations into the science of killing is a multiplicity of approaches that 
reinforce pre-existing design choices about ordnance.  
 
                                                        
47 Kneubuehl et al. (2008), p. 185. 
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As this short history of lethality demonstrates, there have been multiple and contested 
interpretations of how bullets shatter bone. This has not produced a Newtonian or Einsteinian 
revolution in the way militaries define lethality. Rather, there has been a symbiotic 
relationship between those technicians working on evolutions of weapon technology and the 
way that they have sought to convince military officials to adopt and procure their inventions. 
These webs of relations have typically been framed along lines of nationality, theories of race 
and the prejudices of soldiers and engineers. By retelling its history, we can see that there is 
no pure science of lethality; only a science that is framed by the exigencies of military strategy 
and the demands of the state as enabled by engineers. Out of this process the language of 
kinetic effect – as opposed to the language of momentum effect – has been cemented into 
the lexicon of those military-technical officials who were working on how to deliver combat 
effectiveness on the battlefield. 
 
Overkill, counterinsurgency, military doctrine 
In terms of the contemporary international norms of war, it is taken as axiomatic that there is 
a legal distinction between killing in war and killing in peace. When at war, society consents 
to the taking of life as morally, socially and legally acceptable. If soldiers kill without the 
authority afforded by the state, then they break the law. Given these constraints, it is no 
surprise that the training, psychology and doctrine that sustains a soldier’s ability to kill is a 
source of significant discussion.48 
 
As Tony King argues, however, matters relating to training and psychology can also be 
reframed as indicators of the growing professionalisation of the armed forces; a 
professionalisation that is expressed through an increasingly sophisticated use of Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTP) now exploited by the infantry in Close Quarter Battle.49 
These TTPs demand the highly controlled use of force in order to deliver precise tactical effect. 
As such, soldier professionalism is expressed in terms of avoiding overkill through the careful 
                                                        
48 See for instance J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare 
(London: Granta, 1999), p. 239; and D. Grossman, On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War 
and Society, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996). 
49 A. King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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application of technique and the avoidance of inefficient, unnecessary or inadvertent use of 
violence. 
 
What has not been subject to any rigorous analysis, however, is how the science of lethality 
has been operationalised to reinforce and legitimate martial practices as understood through 
doctrine. As this section shows, the military legitimacy of these practices is based on a series 
of contested understandings of lethality which themselves only become readily apparent 
when thinking through the language of kinetic effects as applied in the realms of 
counterinsurgency (COIN). By creating a space for questioning the science of killing in COIN, it 
becomes possible to show how the binary conditions that frame an analysis of lethality in 
conventional war also break down. This then exposes the military to more fundamental 
questions about the instrumentality of war, the value of military life and the effort that armed 
forces make to maintain the notion that war has utility. 
 
When it comes to counterinsurgency and ‘wars among the people’ the initial impulse of the 
armed forces is to try to control the theatre of war.50 In part this is managed by controlling 
the reproduction of ordnance’s brutal effects in the media in order to shape popular responses 
to acts of violence. In practical terms this means minimising obvious bloodshed and 
‘eliminating the visage of death from television’.51 During the first Gulf War, managing the 
media involved embedding journalists into military structures in an effort to make it easier to 
direct the way that reporters visited the battlefield. By extension this gave military planners a 
mechanism for shaping what appeared on CNN and the evening news.52 
 
Framing the way reporters work in an effort to influence the strategic narrative is not the only 
way that armed forces have sought to control the theatre of war. On the contrary, armed 
forces have long understood that they also need to control technology and warfighting 
doctrine so that they produce violent effects in specific ways.53 Precision-guided munitions, 
for example, offer the intoxicating possibility of a clean war. But notions of a clean war can                                                         
50 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 
51 R. Stahl, Militainment, Inc. - War, Media, and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
52 W. Merrin, Digital War - a critical introduction, (London: Routledge. 2018). 
53 A good summary of the RMA and delivering just-in-time military effects can be found in D. Lonsdale, The Nature 
of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future, (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
Page 19 of 28 
even be found in the way that armed forces have regularly sought to reduce the blood and 
gore that is produced from low-technology ordnance like small arms ammunition. These 
efforts have the benefit of reducing shock for soldiers while limiting the negative media 
connotations that might emerge from accusations of pursuing a policy of ‘overkill’. Thus, for 
example, in the 1970s during the IRA insurgency, the British Army was very keen to find a 
bullet that had ‘the same accuracy as afforded by the current rifle but which does not 
penetrate nor make a wound of dreadful appearance’.54 In seeking a technical fix, the Army 
recognised that both their existing service ammunition and their soldiers’ inability to shoot 
accurately had the potential to unhinge a strategic narrative that was otherwise framed in 
terms of supporting the police in their endeavours to protect civil society.55 
 
Consequently, in the context of counterinsurgency, applying force judiciously and in ways that 
create definable military effects has been particularly important. In these circumstances, 
although they might otherwise be engaged in what some might describe as a police action,56 
militaries are very keenly aware that if they are to retain their own chain of command and 
avoid excessive civilian oversight then they must carefully balance the way lethality is 
represented. Gung ho expressions of military masculinity are reframed in terms of 
professional TTPs and calibrated applications of violence so as to justify the way that force is 
employed. 
 
With the advent of web 2.0 technologies, however, professional TTPs as they are applied to 
COIN can only go so far. Put simply, technological overkill produces dramatic results that are 
readily amplified online, irrespective of whether armed force is employed in conventional or 
irregular operations. The explosion of digital imagery through social media, whether it has 
been produced by soldier body-cams or citizen journalists, places even more emphasis on 
adopting weapons that limit bloodshed. Failure to take this into consideration plays into the 
hands of those who use digital media and military spectacle to manage how the battlefield is 
                                                        
54 Paper by CDI(A) on Future Tactical Doctrine and Equipment Requirements for Operations in Support of Civil 
Power, 31 July 1970 – Use of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power – Setting up of a Working Party on Internal 
Security Tactical Doctrine, HO 325/132, UK National Archives. 
55 John MacKinlay, “‘Shoot to Kill’ - An Assessment”, British Army Review no. 48 (1974), pp. 45-49. 
56 James Salt and M. L. R. Smith, “Reconciling Policing and Military Objectives: Can Clausewitzian Theory Assist 
the Police Use of Force in the United Kingdom?” Democracy and Security, 4 no.3 (2008), pp. 221-244. 
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represented among civilian audiences; audiences who otherwise might be persuaded to join 
or withdraw from getting involved in combat.57 
 
Nevertheless, sustaining military legitimacy through media manipulation is but one side of the 
challenge of contemporary war. The other and arguably more difficult question facing military 
planners concerns the way that doctrine and technology are standardised so as to further 
control the precise delivery of military effects. Post-Iraq and Afghanistan these concerns find 
their most mediatised expression in the form of drone warfare, technologies that shape the 
martial gaze while enabling greater precision in the use of airpower.58 In terms of doctrine, in 
the early 2000s, the Americans framed their application of these technologies through the 
lens of an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBO). According to EBO, planners would 
define the kinetic and non-kinetic – sometimes described as influencing – effects that they 
wanted to achieve and work backwards to precisely apply a range of military capabilities to 
deliver that outcome.59 
 
Although EBO was eventually rejected by General Mattis in 2008, the notion that the armed 
forces were interested in creating ‘effects’ continued to find its way into military discourse 
especially as it related to COIN doctrine and operations in the human domain.60 The British 
Army’s Countering Insurgency Field Manual, for example notes that, ‘Often, the most effective 
activities are in the psychological domain and are designed to persuade and influence target 
audiences using non-kinetic means’ but that ‘If physical destruction is required to achieve the 
desired effect, then the commander must consider and balance the potential negative impact 
it may cause against the expected benefits’.61 By the time American and British armed forces                                                         
57 T. Rid and M. Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age, (Westport, CT: Praeger. 2009). 
58 Bousquet, A. “A Revolution in Military Affairs?: changing technology and changing practices of warfare”. In 
Technology and World Politics, edited by D. McCarthy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 165-181; and 
Bousquet, (2019). 
59 For a discussion of the Effects Based Approach see, Tomislav Z. Ruby, “Effects-based Operations: More 
Important Than Ever”, Parameters, Autumn 2008, pp. 26-35. 
60 Tomislav, 2008; for effects, COIN doctrine and the human domain see also US Special Forces Command, 
Operating in the Human Domain, version 1.0, 3 August 2015. This version is available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwiqiamdmenhAhW2Zh
UIHYsjBPoQFjAAegQIAxAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fnsiteam.com%2Fsocial%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F01%2FSOF-OHD-Concept-V1.0-3-Aug-
15.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0fnEQKjKyzJDRX9_M2qBxz. Accessed 24 April 2019. 
61 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency Army Code 71876 October 2009, p. 7-4 
and p. 6-7. 
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had properly updated their COIN manuals to more effectively engage in the Global War on 
Terror the language of kinetics as a way of producing a clinical lethal or societal effect had 
become widely accepted. 
 
Following the end of counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question of 
lethal and non-lethal effects is now firmly embedded in US military doctrine for all types of 
operation, whether conventional or irregular. Thus, in the 2018 version of the US armed forces 
capstone doctrine publication known as Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations it is taken for 
granted that today’s threats can ‘increasingly synchronise, integrate, and direct operations 
and other elements of power to create lethal and nonlethal effects’. 62 The challenge for 
American forces will be to evaluate the outcomes of these lethal and nonlethal effects through 
battle damage assessment; assessment that is designed to demonstrate the feedback loops 
between the application of force and the consequence of that activity.63 
 
Using technology to buttress the utility of doctrine in war is, however, sharply exposed as a 
purely rhetorical fix when set against the way that lethality criteria apply in domestic law. To 
be sure, different jurisdictions have viewed lethality differently over time. What was legally 
acceptable in a colonial context far exceeds what was legally acceptable in metropolitan 
Europe. Even today, hollow point ammunition – ammunition that has similar effects to 
dumdum bullets – is not subject to the Geneva Conventions when used domestically by 
lawfully authorised institutions such as the police. At the same time, in an effort to control the 
public’s access to firearms, countries like Britain have sought to carefully define lethality and 
re-write the legal definition of a firearm in increasingly restrictive ways. Thus, as far as Britain’s 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is concerned, a firearm is a ‘lethal barrelled weapon of any 
description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged’. Even more 
critically from our point of view, the CPS goes on to state that while the notion of lethality is 
complex and subject to the decision of a court of law on advice of the Forensic Science                                                         
62 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017 – Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018, p. I - 3. 
Doctrine note available at: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi9vt
CN6d7hAhUDPVAKHUw7B48QFjAAegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jcs.mil%2FPortals%2F36%2FDocume
nts%2FDoctrine%2Fpubs%2Fjp3_0ch1.pdf%3Fver%3D2018-11-27-160457-
910&usg=AOvVaw04JZDavDBIt1UIInEP4elH. Accessed 20 April 2019. 
63 Joint Publication 3-0, p. II - 11. 
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Provider, air weapons with a kinetic energy at the muzzle of greater than 6 ft lbs are ‘specially 
dangerous’.64 
 
The contrast between the 6 ft lbs and the 58 ft lbs lethality criterion is clearly framed by the 
constraints and perspectives of different legal and military technical communities. The British 
approach to firearms control reveals a discrepancy in how the state defines lethality when 
overseas in a war compared to at home within civil society. So long as these two conditions 
can be kept separate then the inconsistency need not be problematic. Unfortunately, 
however, when the military are employed in policing actions in support of a counterinsurgency 
it becomes readily apparent that lethality has contextually dependent meanings that reflect 
expediency and political choice. In a COIN operation, should the military definition of lethality 
apply or the domestic definition? 
 
In the mid-1990s the effort to reconcile these different definitions of lethality found some 
resolution in the concept of ‘less than lethal’ weapons: weapons with a kinetic energy criterion 
of less than 58 ft lbs.65 During the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the niceties 
of this technological fix were exposed for the rhetorical contradictions that they contained. 
Less than lethal weapons could be just as dangerous when used inappropriately as their 
conventional equivalents. Moreover, the failure to apply domestic policing criteria during 
these operations meant that intervening powers would not make use of forensic techniques 
for gathering evidence about a soldier who had discharged their weapon and where civilians 
had been injured or killed. That this did not happen betrayed the cultural predispositions of 
those powers engaged in civilising unruly parts of the world through military intervention.66 
 
The practical implications of these different definitions of lethality thus manifest themselves 
in paradoxical ways when the context changes from domestic policing to military intervention 
followed by maintaining law and order overseas. What is revealed is the unscientific and 
                                                        
64 ‘Firearms - Legal Guidance’ from the Crown Prosecution Service. Available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/firearms. Site accessed 28 March 2018. 
65 B. Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces?: Technology, Politics and the Management of Conflict 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
66 Mark Neocleous, “The Police of Civilization: The War on Terror as Civilizing Offensive”, International Political 
Sociology, 5, no 2, 2011. 
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contextually specific nature of the military’s approach to lethality. During wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as repeated cases of military abuse surfaced, service personnel and military 
contractors struggled to determine whether their activities ought to be framed in terms of 
domestic law or whether some other legal framework applied.67 If domestic law pertained 
and lethality was defined in non-military terms then the potential was that whole realms of 
military activity would become illegal. 
 
When military power is applied in contexts other than conventional warfare, it becomes easier 
to see how technology and doctrine sloganise kinetic effects in ways that sustain the utility of 
force and subordinate science to war. Domestic definitions of lethality betray the contested 
nature of the kinetic energy criterion and imply that the amount of kinetic energy needed to 
produce death is framed by military rather than scientific considerations. An examination of 
military doctrine demonstrates how kinetic effect is further reified so as to preserve the 
legitimacy of military power beyond irregular and into broader, more conventional 
operations. These reifications are in turn sustained through martial, legal and technological 
practices so as to frame an argument that buttresses claims about the instrumental utility of 
military power. This resonates with what Nisha Shah describes as an ontology of lethality that 
‘delimits the arsenal of acceptable weaponry’ and opens up the discussion as to why the 
armed forces privilege interpretations of lethality that support their technological choices.68 
This then points us towards exploring the politics and preferences of those engaged in framing 
the technologies and techniques of martial practice. 
 
Legitimation, military power and the military’s lethality taboo 
Given the examination so far, it is clear that the science of killing has produced a number of 
ways of making sense of the term lethality. These interpretations have been marshalled and 
then reified in doctrine and technology. The argument made here now turns to the way that 
questioning this ordering of lethality has been rendered taboo by the armed forces themselves 
as they seek to restrict discussion that undermines the efficacy of the military use of force; a                                                         
67 H. Bennett, “The Baha Mousa Tragedy: British Army Detention and Interrogation from Iraq to Afghanistan”, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16, no 2, 2014; E. Klein, “Immunity in Counterinsurgency 
Operations: A Proposal for US Contractors”, Parameters, 47, no 1 2017. 
68 N. Shah, “Gunning for war: infantry rifles and the calibration of lethal force”, Critical Studies on Security 5, no. 
1, (2017), p. 99. 
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discussion that if properly examined would by implication have the potential to delegitimise 
military activity. Far from being arbitrary, then, avoiding discussion of lethality reflects the 
politics and preferences of those engaged in ‘contemporary sovereignty-as-decision-
making’.69 This is not just the instrumentalisation of knowledge for the purposes of securing 
life/death. Rather the science and its supporting mechanisms legitimate the interests of the 
various associated social groups engaged in these activities, working in such a way as to ensure 
certain martial practices can continue without cross-examination. 
 
The question of lethality – as it has been cashed out in terms of kinetic energy – thus 
constitutes a foundational knowledge regime upon which the structures of military power 
have become staked. Investigations into the nature of lethality help to expose the military’s 
social order and its relationships to science, technology and the wider industrial and social 
processes that constitute various types of militarism.70 The kinetic energy criterion is how the 
military define what comprises an effective munition for causing death. As we have seen, 
however, civilian definitions of lethality also have a bearing on how death is produced. It is 
evident, then, that as a mode of delivering military effects, lethality has a unique power that 
serves as a socio-technical metaphor, determining whose life is valued and how death is 
distributed on the battlefield. In this respect, the fact that military definitions of lethality apply 
in irregular civil-military contexts like counterinsurgency shows how socio-technical choices 
privilege the value of an intervening force over those of the civilians that are to be won over.71 
 
The act of opening up the technological black box and investigating the question of lethality 
offers a further explanation for why the armed forces have chosen not to question the kinetic 
energy criterion too closely. To do so reveals that military life is valued over and above that of 
an adversary or a civilian. Left unstated, this in turn creates space for a lethality taboo such 
that the taboo and its transgression are placed in ‘a paradoxical relationship in which each 
causes the other’.72 To question the 58 ft/lb criterion is therefore self-defeating, undermining 
the efficacy of armed force in ways that delegitimise military activity but also the activity of                                                         
69 M. Shapiro, Discourse, Culture, Violence (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), p. 189. 
70 Mabee, Brian, and Srdjan Vucetic, “Varieties of Militarism: towards a typology”, Security Dialogue 49 no: 1-2 
(2018), pp. 96-108. 
71 Ken MacLeish, “The ethnography of good machines”, Critical Military Studies 1 no. 1 (2015), pp.11-22. 
72 Ian Whitmarsh, “The No/Name of the Institution”, Anthropological Quarterly 87, no. 3 (2014), pp. 881. 
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scientists, ordnance manufacturers and all of those involved in the wider social structures of 
militarism. The science of killing accordingly enables military power to be expressed through 
technology but the military itself cannot afford for the various conceptions of lethality to be 
closely questioned for fear that it would undermine the utility of force. 
 
This examination into the epistemology of lethality thus reveals that uncertainty isn’t simply 
constrained to what Clausewitz might describe as luck or chance but also stretches right up to 
the limits of what is both scientifically knowable and militarily acceptable to investigate. 
Further, it demonstrates that the social mechanisms put in place to make sense of what is 
otherwise unknowable are designed in such a way as to perpetuate a mode of thinking about 
war that enshrines a particular ontological outlook. That ontological outlook reinforces the 
utility calculations that underpin our conceptual understanding of strategy and war. What this 
outlook does not do is take into consideration the problem of defining the ontology of war 
given the unstable definition of lethality. 
 
In this respect, at the centre of this epistemology of lethality there is an expanding symmetry 
of explanation such that the social processes that enframe and explain micro-level causal 
chains mimic the macro-level goal of the strategist trying to control campaign narratives. As a 
feminist and gender-based analysis demonstrates, this can be seen in the way that combat is 
constructed as a normative category that enables military masculinities to make sense of and 
discipline battle.73 According to this line of argument the empirical foundations upon which 
notions of combat are framed privilege forms of gender and power relations so as to 
essentialise the space as predominantly male. Similarly, modes of constructing lethality reify 
the utility of force in ways that try to make the battlefield predictable in an effort to stabilise 
martial control of combat. 
 
The object of this science is, then, to measure and make sense of what is otherwise opaque 
and riven with anecdote and at the same time to help impose order on the uncertain. Finding 
ways to (mis-)represent war has always been an object of those who are engaged in 
prosecuting it. By applying a frame of reference drawn from Science and Technology Studies,                                                         
73 Katharine M. Millar and Joanna Tidy, “Combat as a moving target: masculinities, the heroic soldier myth, and 
normative martial violence”, Critical Military Studies 3 no. 2 (2017), pp. 142-160. 
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however, the strategic goal of controlling narratives nonetheless takes on new resonance. As 
Barkawi and Brighton observe, power shapes war/truth in terms that characterise and 
legitimate political violence for those societies engaged in war. This applies equally to those 
actors engaged in framing the way violence is optimised through definitions of lethality. In 
both cases uncertainty can be tracked back to an inability to trace a causal chain of events 
from the strategic to the tactical level. This isn’t just a limitation of the scientific method but 
more deeply speaks to whether an ontology of war can be rendered transparent.74 
 
Investigations into the epistemology of lethality thus reveal something that is missing from 
literatures on critical war studies. Brighton argues that war ‘forces the unmaking and remaking 
of social and political meaning in ways that defy prediction’.75 The attempt by armed forces 
to impose order through science – irrespective of the precision of the analysis – is nevertheless 
an attempt to make war predictable. The accuracy of these predictions may well prove to be 
uncertain. It remains the case, however, that the armed forces themselves have sought to 
tame the unknowable battlefield through technology even as fighting has sought to unmake 
the truths produced from war. In this respect, the epistemology of lethality reveals the 
countervailing and multiple truths that co-exist and must be controlled if military 
instrumentality is to be sustained.  
 
Conclusion 
As this paper has demonstrated, the science of killing is a complex field of study. Whereas 
many scholars have previously suggested that lethality is a relatively uncontested field,76 by 
historicising the concept we can see that there is no simple formula for explaining how 
ordnance produces death. On the contrary, this paper shows that the field is contested and 
disobedient and continues to produce multiple interpretations of the processes by which 
bullets shatter bone. By taking an anti-essentialist approach to the study of technology it 
becomes easier to reveal the various trajectories of knowledge and the means by which the 
several interpretations of lethality begin to stabilise and turn into social fact. Consequently,                                                         
74 Marc von Boemcken, “Unknowing the unknowable. From ‘critical war studies’ to a critique of war”, Critical 
Military Studies 2 no.3 (2016), pp. 226-241. 
75 Brighton, “Three propositions on the phenomenology of war”, International Political Sociology 5, no. 1 (2011), 
p. 103. 
76 J. Bourke, Wounding the world: how military violence and war-play invades our lives, (London: Virago, 2014) 
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we see how the subject of lethality fits into the interstices of several overlapping social 
frameworks and as a result is caught between the concerns of soldiers and engineers, 
scientists and surgeons. Oscillating between these constituencies, the various definitions of 
lethality say something about the relative power of those actors who have a role in shaping 
the way that the battlefield is both enacted but also understood. 
 
This is made abundantly clear when military versus civilian characterisations of lethality are 
set side by side. If the 58 ft lbs criterion of lethality is considered overkill by civilian courts the 
question arises as to why this nominal figure might continue to frame weapon selection in 
counterinsurgencies or interventions where population control is more important than killing. 
Not only does this point to the double standards that apply when seeking to manage overseas 
interventions but it also reveals the extent to which the military cannot concede ground to 
those who might question the lethality criterion. According to this rubric, a military definition 
of lethality must be sustained or else policing activities as part of a military intervention would 
become unsustainable. Indeed, to concede the point about lethality would also be to accede 
to a level of civilian oversight that would have demanded a degree of forensic policing that 
the armed forces had previously eschewed. At its root then, sustaining the military’s 
independence of action has meant holding on to a military definition of lethality. 
 
The advantage of applying a military definition of lethality over and above that of a civilian 
court is not just in the independence of action that such an approach affords. The dual role of 
lethality also lies in the way that it underlies and further orders the existing relationships of 
power within and between different military constituencies and their scientific and industrial 
partners. In this respect, lethality not only sustains the idea that military power has utility, that 
is to say that instrumental applications of state violence can be used to create pre-determined 
political effects, but it is also used to perpetuate the world views of those strategists, generals 
and policy makers who have a vested interest in retaining their position in the state. Thus, the 
different definitions of lethality have themselves been disciplined by and subordinated 
through the technologies and institutions that powerfully shape and perpetuate those 
meanings. 
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The significance of this paper, however, lies in exposing the underlying reifications that frame 
the concept of lethality and showing that even weapon effects can be deconstructed in ways 
that reveal the politics of making truth from war. Weapon effects themselves represent a form 
of knowledge about the battlefield. This knowledge requires social and scientific buttressing 
in order to sustain the edifice of those engaged in these military practices. As such, 
deconstructing lethality reveals the interlocking matrices of social values and concerns that 
shape the creation and use of military power. By exploring the limits of knowledge as it relates 
to developing a scientific explanation of lethality we can start to offer a further yardstick for 
how war/truth is constructed by the military itself. In the process, this paper points to the way 
that science and technology constitute an important location for studying ontologies of war. 
